

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0017

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: JAN 30 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

SUMMARY. AT THE FIRST PLENARY MEETING OF NEW ROUND, POLISH REP (DABROWA) REFERRED TO THE WESTERN NUCLEAR OFFER (PARAS 19-25) AS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION AND SAID IT WOULD BE DISCUSSED EQUALLY ALONG WITH OTHER PROPOSALS MADE BY PARTICIPANTS. BUT HE SAID THE FACT THAT OFFER WAS DEPENDENT ON EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF UNCHANGED WESTERN PROPOSALS FOR ASYMMETRICAL EASTERN REDUCTIONS SUBSTANTIALLY DIMINISHED ITS VALUE AND SERIOUSLY IMPAIRED THE POSSIBILITY OF ITS CONSTRUCTIVE UTILIZATION. POLISH REP SAID THAT EASTERN FREEZE AND FIRST STEP PROPOSALS REMAINED ON THE

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TABLE AND CALLED FOR EARLY COMPLETION OF WORK TO REACH AN

ACCEPTABLE DEFINITION OF FORCES. FULL TEXT OF DABROWA'S STATEMENT, AS DELIVERED IN ENGLISH, FOLLOWS. CANADIAN REP ALSO SPOKE AT JAN 30 PLENARY; SUMMARY OF HIS PRESENTATION BEING REPORTED SEPTEL.) IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH BELGIAN REP, DABROWA INDICATED THAT EAST INTENDED TO ASK SOME FURTHER QUESTIONS ON THE WESTERN NUCLEAR REDUCTION PROPOSAL IN FIRST INFORMAL SESSION ON FEB 3.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. ALLOW ME TO OPEN MY STATEMENT WITH THE EXPRESSION OF THE HOPE OF THE POLISH DELEGATION THAT THE VIIIITH ROUND OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WE BEGIN TODAY WILL BRING PROGRESS IN FULFILLMENT OF THE DIFFICULT TASK FACING US, AND THAT OUR WORK WILL BE CHARACTERIZED BY THE READINESS TO CO-OPERATE FOR THE SAKE OF CONSOLIDATING AND DEVELOPING THE PROCESS OF DETENTE.

2. THE SOCIALIST STATES ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE PROGRESS OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF 17 DECEMBER 1975 THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES REAFFIRMED THEIR RESOLVE TO MAKE INCESSANT EFFORTS FOR REAL PROGRESS IN THE TALKS AND EXPRESSED THE CONVICTION THAT THESE TALKS SHOULD LEAD TO SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DIMINISHING THE SECURITY OF ANY STATE.

3. WE ARE OPENING THE NEW ROUND ON THE THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF THE BEGINNING OF THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS. AT THAT TIME WE WERE ABLE TO OVERCOME DIFFERENCES AND BRING ABOUT THE IMPORTANT CONSENT, PROVIDING BASIC GUIDELINES FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. LET IT BE FOR US AN ENCOURAGING EVIDENCE THAT PROGRESS IN SOLVING DIFFICULT ISSUES IS POSSIBLE IF ALL PARTIES REFRAIN FROM ANY ATTEMPTS TO RECEIVE UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES.

4. I AM MENTIONING THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS HERE BOTH IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN THE CONVICATION ABOUT A POSSIBILITY TO REACH AN AGREEMENT AS WELL AS TO UNDERLINE ANEW THE IMPORTANCE OF OBSERVING THE ONCE AGREED STIPULATIONS.

5. IN VIEW OF THE SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS, THE AGREEMENT
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WHICH WE STRIVE FOR IN VIENNA SHOULD INCLUDE, IN ORDER TO FULLY ENSURE THE NON-DIMINISHED SECURITY OF ANY STATE, THE FOLLOWING MAIN ELEMENTS:

A/ ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OF THE TALKS WOULD HAVE TO UNDERTAKE REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUALITY;

B/ REDUCTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE CARRIED OUT ON THE BASIS OF
EQUALITY;

C/ ALL KINDS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE
WOULD HAVE TO BE INCLUDED INTO THE REDUCTION PROCESS.

6. WE ATTACH PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THE PARTICIPATION
IN REDUCTIONS OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.
WE HAVE ENTERED THEM AS EUROPEAN NEGOTIATIONS, RESOLVED TO
SUBMIT OURSELVES TO AGREE REDUCTIONS AND EXPECTING THE SAME
FROM OUR PARTNERS. THESE EXPECTATIONS WERE WELL-FOUNDED ON
THE COMMONLY AGREED PRINCIPLES AND DECLARATIONS OF INTENT BY
THE NATO STATES THEMSELVES.

7. I WISH ONLY TO REMIND THE ROME DECLARATION OF MAY 1970,
ALREADY QUOTED IN THIS ROOM, IN WHICH IT WAS POINTED OUT,
INTER ALIA, THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE ON THE BASIS
OF RECIPROCITY AND SHOULD INCLUDE STATIONED AND INDIGENOUS
FORCES AND THEIR WEAPON SYSTEMS.

8. OUR POSITION IN THIS MATTER DOES NOT RESULT FROM THE
DESIRE TO IMPOSE DISCRIMINATORY LIMITATIONS ONTO INDIVIDUAL
STATES. IT RATHER STEMS FROM OUR SECURITY INTERESTS AS WELL
AS FROM THE DEEPLY ROOTED CONVICTION ABOUT THE NEED TO MAKE
A DEFINITE CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROCESS OF MILITARY DETENTE
BY ALL STATES.

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9. IN ORDER TO HAVE LASTING EFFECTS UPON THE SITUATION IN EUROPE, THE MILITARY DETENTE - LIKE THE POLITICAL ONE - CANNOT BE LIMITED TO UNDERTAKINGS BY THE TWO BIG POWERS ALONE. IT IS NECESSARY FOR OTHER STATES TO PARTICIPATE IN DISARMEMENT MEASURES, AND ESPECIALLY FOR THOSE WHO POSSESS SIGNIFICANT MILITARY POTENTIAL IN THE AREA. THESE STATES HAD, WHILE ENTERING IN GOOD FAITH THE NEGOTIATIONS, HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE NECESSITY TO ACCEPT DEFINITE OBLIGATIONS. WE CONSIDER UNTHINKABLE A SITUATION UNDER WHICH SOME STATES WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES WITHOUT KNOWING WHAT KIND OF REDUCTIONS, IF ANY, IS TO BE CARRIED OUT BY OTHER PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT.

10. NO LESS IMPORTANT IS THAT THE REDUCTION SHOULD BE
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CARRIED OUT UPON A JUST BASIS OF EQUALITY. THE BEST WAY TO IMPLEMENT THIS WOULD BE TO EFFECT CUTS EQUAL IN NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE. CONTRARY TO THIS, ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS WOULD LEAD TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF ONE-SIDED MILITARY ADVANTAGES BY SOME PARTICIPANTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT SUCH REDUCTIONS CANNOT BE ACCEPTED BY THE PARTICIPANTS WHO WOULD SEE THEIR SECURITY IMPAIRED.

11. FOR OVER TWO YEARS THE WESTERN STATES HAVE TRIED TO JUSTIFY THE POSTULATE OF LIMITING REDUCTIONS TO GROUND FORCES ALONE. A POSSIBILITY OF REDUCING AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS EXCLUDED, AND THE INTEREST IN REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS WAS LIMITED TO SOVIET TANKS. RECENTLY THERE HAVE APPEARED WESTERN IDEAS WHICH INDICATE THE RECOGNITION OF THE OBVIOUS TRUTH THAT ALL KINDS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS MAKE UP AN INTEGRAL WHOLE AND ONLY TAKEN TOGETHER DETERMINE THE ACTUAL FORCE RELATIONSHIP.

12. THE NEGOTIATING POSITION OF THE SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS IS FOUNDED UPON THE AGREED PRINCIPLES AND ENVISAGES THE ABOVE SPECIFIED ELEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT.

13. THE DRAFT AGREEMENT SUBMITTED BY CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE SOVIET UNION AND POLAND ON 8 NOVEMBER 1973 PROVIDES FOR MUTUAL AND EQUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, IN TOTAL BY OVER 15 PERCENT. THE REDUCTION WOULD ENCOMPASS ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE AREA, BOTH NATIONAL AND FOREIGN, GROUND AND AIR, INCLUDING UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

14. TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION SOME CONCERNS OF THE WESTEN STATES AND SHOWING OUR CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH AND FLEXIBILITY, THE SOCIALIST STATES HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY CONTRIBUTED TO A RAPPROACHEMENT BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE ATTITUDES. THE ADDITIONS TO THE DRAFT, SUGGESTED IN MARCH 1975, WERE A VERY IMPORTANT STEP IN THIS DIRECTION. THEY PROVIDED FOR PRIOR REDUCTIONS OF THE USSR AND US FORCES IN COMPARISON TO THE FORCES OF OTHER STATES, IN TWO CONSECUTIVE STAGES OF OUR DRAFT.

15. IN AN ATTEMPT TO FACILITATE THE SEARCH FOR A COMMON NEGOTIATING GROUND, THE SOCIALIST STATES HAVE ALSO PROPOSED
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TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF THE FORCE CLASSIFICATION IN THE AREA BY ARRIVING AT AN AGREED DEFINITION. A SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THIS WORK WILL HAVE GREAT SIGNIFICANCE FOR PROGRESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

16. BEING FULLY AWARE OF THE STILL EXISITNG DIFFICULTIES IN ACHIEVING A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS, THE SOCIALIST STATES HAVE SUGGESTED AN EARLIER ACCOMPLISHMENT OF PARTIAL MEASURES:

- IN OCTOBER 1974 WE TABLED THE PROPOSAL FOR A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON THE "INITIAL STEP" REDUCTIONS;

- IN DECEMBER 1974 OUR STATES INTRODUCED THE IDEA OF THE JOINT DECLARATION BY THE 11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON THE NON-INCREASE OF NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.

17. WE CONTINUE TO TREAT THESE PROPOSALS AS VALID AND IMPOR-
TANT. THEIR IMPLEMENTATION, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE BASIC POSITIONS AND WITHOUT UNDERMINING THE EFFORTS TOWARDS A COMPREHEN-
SIVE AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS, WOULD HAVE GREAT MEANING FOR OUR WORK. THE CONSENT OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS NOT TO INCREASE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, WOULD HAVE UNQUESTIONABLY POSITIVE BEARING UPON A FURTHER IMPROVEMENT OF POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IN EUROPE.

18. IN HOPE THAT DURING THE INTERMISSION THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS HAVE RE-ASSESSED THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS OUR PROPOSALS.

19. ON 16 DECEMBER 1975 THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS INTRODUCED SOME ADDITIONS TO THE "OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS" PUT FORWARD ON 22 NOVEMBER 1973. WE NOTE IN THESE ADDITIONS THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE NEED TO INCLUDE NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER A REDUCTION SCHEME.

20. THE SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE TALKS HAVE ADVOCATED THE COVERING BY A REDUCTION PROCESS OF ALL KINDS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE AREA, TOGETHER WITH NUCLEAR ARMS. THEREFORE, THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE READINESS TO INCLUDE UNDER REDUCTION A PART OF THE AMERICAN TACTICAL
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS A MOVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

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21. HOWEVER, THIS PROPOSAL HAS BEEN FITTED INTO THE WHOLE WESTERN REDUCTION SCHEME WHICH WE CAN NOT ACCEPT FOR OBVIOUS REASONS, AS HAS BEEN EXPLAINED ON MANY OCCASIONS.

22. OUR AGREEMENT CAN NOT BE BUILT UPON A DESIRE TO CHANGE THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF WESTERN STATES, OR IN OTHER WORDS - TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY BENEFITS TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE SECURITY OF THE SOCIALIST STATES. NAMELY, THIS IS THE AIM OF THE PROPOSAL FOR ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTION, ACCORDING TO WHICH THE SOCIALIST STATES WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE MORE THAN TWICE AS MUCH OF THEIR FORCES AS THE WESTERN STATES.

23. ALSO A SERIOUS OBSTACLE ON THE WAY TO OUR AGREEMENT
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IS THE INSISTENCE ON THE CONCEPT OF "COLLECTIVE CEILINGS" AND THE PERSISTENT REFUSAL OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES AND CANADA TO CLEARLY DEFINE WHAT KIND OF REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS THEY ARE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE. AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THIS ATTITUDE, THE NEW PROPOSAL IS OF A LIMITED NATURE BECAUSE IT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR A REDUCTION OF THOSE ELEMENTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEMS WHICH ARE AT THE DISPOSAL OF OTHER THAN US STATES IN THE AREA.

24. THUS, THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS CONDITION THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CERTAIN REDUCTION STEPS UPON THE ACCEPTANCE BY THE SOCIALIST STATES OF THEIR ENTIRE REDUCTION SCHEME. THE DEMAND FOR UNRESERVED ACCEPTANCE OF THIS SCHEME, EMBODIED IN THE PROPOSAL OF 16 DECEMBER 1975, SUBSTANTIALLY DIMINISHES ITS VALUE AND SERIOUSLY IMPAIRS THE POSSIBILITY OF ITS CONSTRUCTIVE UTILISATION.

25. SINCE WE FIND THIS PROPOSAL ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, IT WILL BE DISCUSSED EQUALLY AS OTHER PROPOSALS MADE BY THE PARTICIPANTS. WE HOPE THAT IN THE COURSE OF OUR TALKS THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS WILL ELABORATE IT IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

26. IT IS OUR BELIEF THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT TASK DURING THE PRESENT ROUND IS TO EXERT OUR EFFORTS TO AGREE ON THE ISSUES VITAL FOR THE PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THAT IS:

A/ PRECISE FORMULATION OF REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS OF EACH

DIRECT PARTICIPANT, WHEN AND HOW IT SHOULD REDUCE;

B/ DETERMINATION WHAT AND HOW MUCH IS TO BE REDUCED;

C/ POSSIBLY EARLIEST COMPLETION OF THE IMPORTANT WORK
ON THE DEFINITION OF WHAT FORCES IN THE AREA FOR THE PURPOSE
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BELONG TO GROUND AND AIR FORCES
RESPECTIVELY.

27. SOLUTION OF THESE QUESTIONS, WITH DUE ACCOUNT TO THE
SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL STATES, COULD LEAD US TO UNDERTAKING
OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE, PRACTICAL MEASURES IN THE FIELD OF
REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

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